The Robert L. Levine Distinguished Lecture Series, Lecture, Race Relations Law in the Canon of Legal Academica by Kennedy, Randall Leroy
 
The Robert L. Levine Distinguished Lecture Series, Lecture, Race
Relations Law in the Canon of Legal Academica
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Randall Kennedy, The Robert L. Levine Distinguished Lecture
Series, Lecture, Race Relations Law in the Canon of Legal
Academica, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1985 (2000).
Published Version http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol68/iss6/3/
Accessed February 16, 2015 5:30:34 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12911348
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAFordham Law Review
Volume 68|Issue 6 Article 3
2000
The Robert L. Levine Distinguished Lecture Series,
Lecture, Race Relations Law in the Canon of Legal
Academica
Randall Kennedy
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contacttmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Randall Kennedy,The Robert L. Levine Distinguished Lecture Series, Lecture, Race Relations Law in the Canon of Legal Academica, 68
FordhamL. Rev. 1985 (2000).
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol68/iss6/3LECTURE
RACE RELATIONS  LAW IN THE CANON  OF
LEGAL ACADEMIA
Randall Kenned'
Should  a  course  on  race  relations  law  be  part  of  the  curricular
canon of a law school?  If so, what should such a course offer?  If such
a course is offered, with what political and pedagogical attitude should
it be taught?  These are the primary questions addressed in this Essay.
I.
Law schools should  equip students with knowledge  and  techniques
that the legal  academy  is well  positioned  to explore  and impart  and
that will be of benefit to society.  From this premise it  follows that a
law  school should  offer a  course  that investigates  the ways  in which
race  relations  have  affected  and  have  been  affected  by  legal
institutions,  particularly  the judiciary.  After  all,  racial  conflicts  and
efforts  to regulate them  have played  a large  and ongoing  part in the
development  of  American  common  law,  statutory  law,  and
constitutional  law.  On one  level, this  is  an  obvious point.  Anyone
with an appreciable  knowledge of the United States  knows that  race
matters and has long mattered  to Americans.  On another level, even
well-educated  people  are  often  unaware  of the  pervasiveness  of  the
influence  of  racial  conflict  upon  Americans'  preferences,  habits,
conduct,  and  institutions.  Many  are  aware  at  some  vague,  abstract
level  that  racial  "slavery"  and  "segregation"  and  other  forms  of
"oppression"  have  mocked  the  high-minded  ideals  voiced  in  the
foundational  documents  of  the  United  States.  Relatively  few,
however,  receive  instruction  in  secondary  schooling  or  college  that
enables them to have a vivid and detailed  understanding of these evils
and of their ramifications.
Law schools should  also  allocate substantial  resources  to the study
of  race  relations  law  because  of  the  peculiarly  influential  role  of
*  This  Essay  is  a revised  version  of a  lecture  given  as  part of the  Robert  L
Levine Distinguished Lecture  Series presented at Fordham Law School on October 5,
1999.  A version of this  essay will  appear in  an  upcoming book.  Randall  Kennedy,
Race Relations Law in  the  Canon of Legal Academia, in  Legal  Canons  (Balkin  &
Levinson eds., forthcoming 2000).
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attorneys  in  the  United  States.  Attorneys  constitute  a  significant
group even  when they  stay within  a narrow professional  niche; after
all,  one  of  the  three  branches  of  federal  power,  the  judiciary,  is
virtually  an  exclusive  preserve  of  attorneys.  The  influence  of
attorneys  as  a  group,  however,  extends  far  beyond  the  judiciary
insofar as many lawyers  pursue careers in legislatures, administration,
journalism,  and  business.  Given  the  depth,  complexity,  and
pervasiveness of racial controversies  in the United States, an attorney
who  is  ignorant  of "The  American  Dilemma"  is  an  attorney  with  a
deficient education.  Given the influence of lawyers, the prospect that
an  appreciable  number  of  them  might  be  undereducated  about  a
matter that is so vital to American  democracy  is a cause  for concern
and an impetus to support the study of race relations law.
Wherever  one turns  in the legal  universe,  one  encounters disputes
that  have  often  reached  their  most  intense  pitch  in  the  crucible  of
struggles  over  "the  race  question."  Americans  have  come  to  blows
with  one  another  over  a  variety  of  divisions-for  example,  class
conflict,  gender  distinctions,  ideological  splits,  and  religious
differences.  It  was  disagreement  over  the  fate  of  racial  slavery,
however,  that  erupted  into  civil  war.  The  effort  to  re-create  a
shattered union in the aftermath of that war led to three amendments
to  the  United  States  Constitution-the  Thirteenth,  Fourteenth,  and
Fifteenth  Amendments-that  fundamentally  changed  the relation  of
the individual to state and federal governments and the relation of the
states  to  the  central  government.  A  very  large  portion  of
constitutional law today stems from this transformation.  This includes
not  only judicial, legislative,  and executive  actions  that  are explicitly
racial in  nature, but also  most of the actions  taken by  states that  are
alleged  to violate  the  federally guaranteed  rights  of individuals.'  A
course  on  race  relations  and  the  law  should  be  a  central  curricular
offering  at every  law  school  because  every  lawyer  should  know,  as
part  of  his  or her  mastery  of  the  key  elements  of  American  legal
institutions, that the struggle against racial injustice has been the great
seedbed for advances in civil liberties and civil rights for all persons.
Responses  to  racial  abuses  of  power  have  led  to  the  creation  of
much of the law that protects due process and freedom  of expression.2
Such  responses  have  also  led  to  important  achievements  in  other
areas.  Citizenship,  for  example,  is  a  fundamental  legal  status.  It
distinguishes  members of a polity from those  who  are  non-members.
1.  See Clement Eaton, The Freedom-of-Thought  Struggle  in the Old South  118-
43 (rev. & enlarged ed., Harper & Row 1964)  (1940);  Randall  Kennedy, Race, Crime,
and the Law 29-135 (1997).
2.  See  Michael  Kent  Curtis,  No  State  Shall  Abridge:  The  Fourteenth
Amendment  and the Bill of Rights 25-26 (1986);  Eric Foner, The Story of American
Freedom  163-93  (1998);  Harry  Kalven, Jr.,  The Negro  and the  First Amendment  65-
121  (1965);  William  Lee  Miller,  Arguing  About  Slavery:  The  Great  Battle  in  the
United States Congress 491-514 (1996).
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It  thus  implicates  what  Michael  Walzer  describes  as  the  most
important  questions  in  adjudicating  matters  of  distributive  justice:
Who constitutes  the relevant  community and  how  is that community
constituted?3
The  Constitution of  1787  neglected  to  define  national  citizenship.
In  the  infamous  case  of  Dred Scott  v.  Sandford, 4  however,  the
Supreme  Court decided  that whatever  the  full  meaning  of  national
citizenship,  it  meant  at  least  the  exclusion  of  African  Americans.5
Blacks,  the  Court  ruled,  whether  enslaved  or  free,  could  never
become citizens of the United States.6  To change that radical act  of
rejection  required  a  constitutional  amendment.  The  Fourteenth
Amendment declares that "[a]ll  persons born ...  in the United States,
and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof,  are  citizens  of the  United
States."7  Birth-right  citizenship  is  a  distinctive  feature  of American
political culture.  Without a knowledge of race relations and its effect
on legal developments,  one cannot understand  satisfactorily  the roots
of  this definition  of  American  citizenship  and  the  reason  proposals
that even  consider  changing  it generate  high  anxiety,  if not  outright
condemnation.8
Being  born in  the United  States  is  not the only way  to become  a
citizen;  one  can  also  attain  citizenship  through  naturalization.  The
history of naturalization is another story significantly shaped by racial
conflict.  From  1790  until  1952,  federal  law  stipulated  that,  with
certain exceptions,  a person had to be  "white"  in order to be eligible
for  naturalization.9   The  enforcement  of  this  law  created  a
jurisprudence  of  racial  classification  that  deemed  people  of certain
nationalities  or ethnicities  to  be "white"-and  therefore  eligible  for
3.  See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and  Equality
31-35 (1983).
4.  60 U.S. 393 (1856).
5.  See id at 406-07.
6.  See id
7.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
8.  See Peter H. Schuck & Rogers M. Smith, Citizenship Without  Consent: Illegal
Aliens in the American  Polity 2-3, 63-83  (1985); see also Gerald L Neuman,  Back to
Dred Scott?, 24 San Diego L. Rev. 485, 485-86  (1987)  (reviewing Peter H. Schuck &
Rogers M. Smith, Citizenship Without  Consent: Illegal Aliens in  the American  Polity
(1985)).
9.  In 1870,  for example,  Congress  made  persons born  in Africa  and  persons of
African  descent eligible  for naturalization. See  Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Policies:
Messages of Exclusion to African Americans, 37 How.  L.J.  237,245 & n.40 (1994).  As
anticipated,  however,  in  the  nineteenth  century,  relatively  few  people  in  these
categories immigrated  to the United States  and  became  naturalized  citizens.  In the
twentieth century, the numbers have grown but are still strikingly small in comparison
with peoples from other areas of the world. See id. at 240; see also Charles Gordon,
The  Racial Barrier to American  Citizenship, 93  U.  Pa.  L  Rev.  237,  238-41  (1945)
(examining the origin and development of racial restrictions on naturalization).
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citizenship-and  people  of  other  nationalities  or  ethnicities  to  be
"nonwhite"-and therefore doomed to permanent status as aliens." 0
Many  people  take  for  granted  the  demographics  of  the  United
States, as if the character of the population was merely  an accident  of
history.  A  properly constructed  course  on race  relations  law  would
teach students that, to  a substantial extent, racial considerations have
shaped immigration  policies." 1  For example, absent the  anti-Chinese
animus  that led  to  the Chinese Exclusion  Act  of 188212  and  the anti-
Japanese prejudice  that led  to the Japanese  Exclusion  Act of  1924,'1
there would be a considerably  larger presence  of Asian Americans in
the  United  States  today.14  Many  people  also  take  for  granted  the
geography  of the United  States,  as if that, too,  simply  emerged  as  a
fact of nature.  A good course  on race relations law, however,  would
show  that  racial  conflict  significantly  shaped  the  negotiations,
transactions,  and  conquests  pursuant  to  which  the  United  States,
dominated  by "white"  people, wrested  a continent  away from various
peoples  who  were  perceived  as  colored:  the  "red"  Indians  and  the
"brown" Mexicans.'
5
Many people take for granted their racial identity  and that of their
friends,  kin, lovers,  and neighbors.  A comprehensive  course  on race
relations  law  would  show,  however,  that in  substantial  numbers  of
cases,  the  question  "Who  is  'white'?"  or  "Who  is  'colored'?"  has
generated  sharp  conflict,  giving  rise  to some  of  the  most  poignant
disputes  in  all  of  American  law. 6  Consider,  for  example,  Green  v.
10.  See Ian F. Haney L6pez, White By Law: The Legal  Construction of Race  116-
33 (1996).
11.  See  Gabriel J. Chin,  The Civil Rights Revolttion Comes to Immigration Law:
A New  Look at the Immigration  and Nationality Act of 1965,75 N.C. L. Rev. 273,275-
76 (1996).
12.  Act  of May  6,  1882,  ch.  126,  22  Stat.  58  (Chinese  Exclusion  Act  of  1882),
repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943,  ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600.
13.  Immigration  Act of 1924,  ch.  190, 43 Stat.  153,  repealed by Immigration  and
Nationality (McCarran-Walter)  Act of 1952, ch. 477, tit. IV, § 403(a)(23),  66 Stat.  163,
279.
14.  See  Bill  Ong  Hing,  Making  and  Remaking  Asian  America  Through
Immigration  Policy 1850-1990,  at 43-49 (1993).
15.  See Reginald  Horsman, Race and Manifest  Destiny: The Origins  of American
Racial Anglo-Saxonism  189-90, 231 (1981).
16.  See, e.g.,  F. James Davis, Who is Black?  One Nation's Definition  1-16  (1991)
(describing  who  is considered  black  historically  in  the  United  States);  Virginia  R.
Dominguez,  White  By  Definition:  Social  Classification  in  Creole  Louisiana  23-55
(1986)  (discussing  the  history of racial  classifications);  Charles  S.  Mangum,  Jr.,  The
Legal  Status  of the Negro  1-17  (1940)  (surveying  contemporary  state  laws  defining
who is a Negro); Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, Race Distinctions  in American  Law 12-
25 (Negro  Univs. Press  1969)  (1910)  (analyzing the question of "What  is  a Negro?");
Christopher A.  Ford,  Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-
Conscious Law, 82  Cal.  L.  Rev.  1231,  1231-32,  1262-79  (1994)  (exploring  laws  and
regulations  that  classify  by  race  or  other  grouping);  Ariela  J.  Gross,  Litigating
Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in  the Nineteenth-Century South,  108  Yale
L.J. 109, 123-56  (1998)  (discussing uses of racial knowledge,  "evidence and essences,"
physical attributes, ancestry and reputation  to determine race); Christine  B. Hickman,
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City of New  Orleans7  which  arose  from  the  following  heartrending
facts.  A white  woman  gave  birth  to  a  baby.  Soon  afterwards,  the
woman  died.  The  woman's  sister  took the  baby  to  her home  and
planned to raise the child.  As time went on, however, the baby's skin
began to darken, which led to complaints from white neighbors."  The
baby's  aunt soon capitulated,  returning  the child,  a  little  girl,  to city
authorities.  These  authorities  placed  the  child  with  black  foster
parents who,  falling in love  with  her, sought to adopt  the child.  The
authorities initially  approved  this effort  but  then resisted it  when  an
examination  of  the  child's  birth  certificate  disclosed  that  she  was
registered  as  "white"  by  the  state  Bureau  of  Vital  Statistics. 9  A
Louisiana  law  prohibited  adoption  across  racial  lines.  The  foster
parents sought  to change  the  racial  designation  on  the  child's  birth
certificate  from  "white"  to  "colored. ' 2   But  this  effort,  too,  was
thwarted.  Considering that the mother was white, that the identity of
the father was unknown, that experts in racial classification  disagreed,
that the child's racial character was ambiguous, and that initial official
declarations of racial identity were entitled to a strong presumption of
validity,  the  authorities  refused  to  change  the  child's  racial
designation.  The  Louisiana  Court  of  Appeals  affirmed  this  ruling,
stating  a  change  in  racial  designation  should  occur  only  when  the
relevant  evidence  "leaves  no  room  for  doubt"2'  because  the
registration of a racial  birthright  "must  be  given  as much  sanctity  in
the law  as the registration  of a property  right."2'  This ruling left the
child in  limbo.  As  a  white  child,  she could  not  be  adopted  by  the
black foster parents who had grown to love her.  As a person of color,
she  stood  no  chance  of  being  accepted  socially  by  whites  in
segregationist  Louisiana,  regardless  of  what  her  birth  certificate
The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories,  African Americans, and the U.S.
Census, 95  Mich.  L.  Rev.  1161,  1164-66  (1997)  (discussing  the  rise  of  a  biracial
population  in the  United  States  and  its  effect  on  traditional  racial  classifications);
Peggy  Pascoe,  Miscegenation  Law,  Court  Cases, and  Ideologies  of  "Race"  in
Twentieth-Century America,  83  J.  Am.  Hist.  44,  48-67  (1996)  (discussing  what
constitutes  race in the context of anti-miscegenation  laws); John  C.  Calhoun,  Note,
Who  is  a Negro?,  11  U.  Fla.  L.  Rev.  235,  235-40  (1958)  (reviewing  elaborate
definitions  in anti-miscegenation  statutes and  recommending  standardization)  Chris
Ballentine, Note, "Who is a Negro?" Revisited: Determining Individual Racial Status
for Purposes of Affirmative Action, 35 U.  Fla. L. Rev.  683, 685-90  (1983)  (examining
racial criteria for affirmative  action programs).
17.  88 So. 2d 76 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
18.  See iL at 77.
19.  See id.
20.  See id.
21.  Id  at 80 (quoting Treadaway  v.  Louisiana State Bd.  of Health, 56 So. 2d 249,
250 (La. Ct. App. 1952)).
22.  Id. at 81  (quoting Treadaway  v. Louisiana State  Bd. of Health. 61  So. 2d 735,
739 (La. 1952)).
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stated.  Few cases illustrate more vividly the cruel lunacy of American
pigmentocracy. 23
Granted  the  significance  of  the  race  question  in  American  legal
culture, why explore  it in  a specialized  course?  Might  such  a course
be  relegated  to  an  academic  ghetto  by professors  and  students  who
perceive it as  a  sop to "political  correctness?"  Why  not explore  the
subject throughout the law school curriculum?
Exploring  the  racial  dimensions  of  a  subject  ought  to  be  done
wherever pursuing such a tack would be enlightening given the aims at
hand.  For  example,  if  one  seeks,  in  a  course  on  contracts,  to
investigate the  duty to speak, misrepresentation,  caveat  emptor,  and
related concepts, one might well do so in the context of cases in which
men  have  sought to  escape  matrimonial  obligations  on  the grounds
that wives or fianc6es  had concealed  or failed  to disclose  their racial
ancestries. 4   A  teacher  of  property  concerned  with  exploring
arguments for and against  various modes of governmental regulation
of  housing  markets,  should  certainly  consider  using,  as  heuristic
vehicles,  the  laws  that  prohibit  racial  discrimination  in  housing
transactions.25  A teacher  of  civil  procedure  can  do  no  better  than
Walker v.  City of Birmingham 6-a  case arising from racial conflict  on
a grand scale-in  terms of introducing  students  to the  collateral  bar
rule.27  A  teacher  of  torts,  interested  in  generating  lively  and
instructive  class  discussion  on the  intentional  infliction  of emotional
23.  See  generally Amy  L.  Chua,  Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a
New  Paradigm  for Law and Development, 108  Yale L.J.  1, 24  (1998)  (discussing and
defining "pigmentocracy").
24.  See, e.g.,  In  re Monks'  Estate,  120  P.2d  167,  169  (Cal.  Dist.  Ct. App.  1941)
(contesting  a  will  on  the  grounds  that  the  decedent's  marriage  violated  anti-
miscegenation  laws);  Theophanis  v.  Theophanis,  51  S.W.2d  957,  958  (Ky.  1932)
(analyzing a husband's  allegation  that he  was  never married  to  his wife because  she
was  a mulatto); Sunseri  v. Cassagne,  185 So. 1, 4-5  (La. 1938)  (analyzing  a  husband's
suit  to  annul his  marriage  because  his  wife was  a  member  of the  negro  race);  Van
Houten  v.  Morse,  38 N.E. 705, 705  (Mass.  1894)  (discussing the defense  of breach of
promise  to marry  based  on plaintiff's alleged  concealment of "some  negro  blood  in
her  veins"):  Ferrall  v.  Ferrall, 69  S.E.  60,  62-63  (N.C. 1910)  (Clark, J.,  concurring)
(denying  a husband  his  request  to annul  his  marriage  because  of his wife's  alleged
African American ancestry).
25.  For a first-year  casebook on property law that spends  a considerable  amount
of space exploring issues involving racial conflict, see Joseph William Singer, Property
Law:  Rules,  Policies,  and  Practices  (2d  ed.  1997).  See  also  Race,  Poverty,  and
American  Cities  (John Charles  Boger  & Judith  Welch  Wegner  eds.,  1996)  at  ix-xi
(suggesting that problems of urban unrest are rooted  in poverty and race); Clement E.
Vose,  Caucasians  Only:  The  Supreme  Court,  the  NAACP,  and  the  Restrictive
Covenant  Cases  (1959)  passim  (discussing  racism  with  respect  to  property  and
restrictive covenants).
26.  388 U.S. 307 (1967).
27.  See generally Alan F. Westin  & Berry  Mahoney,  The Trial of Martin  Luther
King (1974)  (telling the story of King's arrest in Birmingham for defying a court order
not to parade without a permit).
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distress, should  consider including  in the syllabus  one or more  of the
many cases in which the word "nigger"  has prompted  a lawsuit?
There  are  many  other  contexts  in  which,  outside  of  a  course
specifically devoted to race relations, the race question can be usefully
explored.  In a course on jurisprudence, one may consider including in
the  syllabus  cases,  speeches,  and  other  materials  generated  in  the
eighteenth  and nineteenth  centuries  by American  combatants  for or
against slavery-for example Nat Turner, David Walker, John Brown,
John  C.  Calhoun,  William  Lloyd  Garrison,  and  Jefferson  Davis-to
probe the  conditions  under which  people  are  obligated  to  obey  the
law  or justified  in  taking  up  arms  against  the  state.  In  teaching  a
course on professional responsibility,  an instructor  might  want to ask
whether an attorney's Jewishness  ought to figure  into her decision to
accept or decline as a client a bank accused of hiding Nazi war loot or
whether an attorney's  "blackness"  ought to figure  into his decision to
accept  or  decline  as  a  client  a  firm  charged  with  illegal  racial
discrimination in hirings or promotions.29
Hence,  without  any  sort  of  overreaching,  there  exist  many
opportunities  for  professors  teaching  basic  subjects  to  highlight  the
racial  aspects  or  consequences  of  a  given  problem  or  doctrine.
Teachers  should  seize  upon  these  occasions  when  it  furthers  the
academic mission of the project at hand.  It is unlikely, however, that
professors teaching a course on contracts, torts, civil procedure, and so
on,  will  have  time  to  assess  comprehensively  the  distinctly  racial
aspect of their subject, for example the development of various racial
ideologies  within the American  judiciary.  After all, the  primary  aim
of  a  course  on  contracts  or torts  or  civil  procedure  is  to develop  a
mastery  of  those  subjects.  Although  studying  racial  conflict  may
illuminate an area of those subjects, they encompass far more territory
than even the large area of racial conflict.  To study as a primary focus
of  inquiry  the  relationship  between  race  relations  and  the  law,  a
28.  See Johnson v. Fambrough, 706 So. 2d 739, 741  (Ala. Civ. App. 1997); Alcorn
v.  Anbro Eng'g, Inc.,  468 P.2d  216,  217  (Cal.  1970):  Motley  v.  Flowers  &  Versagi
Court Reporters,  No. 72069,  1997  Ohio App. LEXIS  5542, at  *3  (Ct.  App. Dec.  11,
1997); see also Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial  Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling,  17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.  133,  133  (1982)  (citing racial
epithet  cases);  Marjorie  Heins,  Banning  Words:  A  Comment  on  "Words  That
Wound,"  18  Harv.  C.R.-C.L.  L.  Rev.  585,  585  (1983)  (responding  to  Professor
Delgado's  article);  Charles R. Lawrence  III,  If  He Hollers Let Hin Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke  L.J. 431, 449-57 (analyzing  the debate over how
to  handle  the  increasing  number  of racist  speech  incidents  on  college  campuses);
Richard  D. Bernstein,  Note,  First Amendment  Limits on  Tort Liability for Words
Intended to  Inflict  Severe Emotional Distress, 85  Colum.  L.  Rev.  1749.  1752  n.17
(1985)  (citing racial epithet cases).
29.  See  Sanford  Levinson,  Identifying  the  Jewish  Lawyer:  Reflections  on  the
Construction  of Professional  Identity, 14 Cardozo  L. Rev.  1577, 1602  (1993); David  B.
Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First  Amendment. Should a Black Lawyer Represent the
Ku Klux Klan?,  63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1030, 1033 (1995).
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school needs a stand-alone course, a course  in which the race  question
itself can be at the center of attention.
II.
The canon of race relations law in the United  States should consist
of  materials  that  convey  an  understanding  of  the  ideas,  events,
movements,  and personalities that are essential for an appreciation  of
the  large  influence  of  race  relations  upon  American  legal  culture.
This  field  is  too  massive  to  cover  comprehensively  in  any  one
casebook, monograph,  or course.  Hence, the need exists in this field,
as  in  many  others,  for  difficult  choices  governing  the  allocation  of
time, energy,  and  attention.  For teachers facing the  difficult  task  of
selecting  what  to  include,  and  thus  what  to  exclude,  I  offer  the
following suggestions.
The  first stems  from questions  posed by J.M.  Balkin  and  Sanford
Levinson.  In  Canons of Constitutional Law,  after describing  Chief
Justice Roger Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v.  Sanford and Frederick
Douglass's speech Address at Glasgow: The Constitution of the United
States: Is it Pro-Slavery or  Anti-Slavery?, they ask:
Should  either  of  these  two  texts,  or  both,  or  neither,  appear  in
contemporary  constitutional  law  casebooks?  Which  should
American  law  students  study  and  discuss,  which  should  educated
citizens  know  about,  and  which  should  inform  the  work  of  legal
academics  in  the present  era?  Which  of  these  writings,  in short,
should form part of the "canon" of American legal materials? 3°
I  agree  with  their  conclusion  that  Douglass's  speech  warrants
inclusion.  I use it and have found that it adds considerable vitality  to
class  discussions  regarding  slavery,  anti-slavery,  and  the  secession
crisis, and in my view teachers should  import into their  monographs,
casebooks,  syllabi,  lectures,  and  classes  anything  that  makes  the
subject  in  question  more  vivid,  accessible,  and  meaningful  to  their
audiences.  Frederick  Douglass's  biography  and  the  vigor  of  his
speech  and  writings  make  works  by  him  an  especially  attractive
prospect  for  study  and  discussion.  Indeed,  students  are  missing
something  very  important  if  they  do  not  have  direct  access  to  the
voices  and  rhetorics  of  Douglass,  Sojourner  Truth,  Solomon
Northrup, William  Wells  Brown, Harriet  F. Jacobs,  and  other  black
abolitionists  who  skillfully  transmuted  their  experience  as  former
slaves,  runaway  slaves,  or  semi-free  ante-bellum  Negroes  into  a
distinctive  critique  of  "The  Slave  Power".  The  same  is  true  of the
voices  and rhetorics  of Fannie  Lou Hamer,  Bayard  Rustin, Malcolm
X,  Martin  Luther  King,  Jr.,  and  other  champions  of  the  Second
Reconstruction.  Even in a law school course  focused rather narrowly
30.  J.M. Balkin & Sanford  Levinson, The Canon of Constitutional  Law,  111  Harv.
L. Rev. 963, 967-68  (1998)  (footnote omitted).
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on  legal  doctrine,  something  important  is  missing  if  students  are
unaware  of the substance  of King's "I  Have a Dream"  speech  or his
"Letter From A Birmingham Jail."
Levinson  and  Balkin,  however,  do  not  answer  the  question  of
priority.  As  between  Taney's  infamous  opinion  and  Douglass's
stirring speech, they do not say which text a teacher should choose to
study more or  choose  to  study  at  all  if scarcities  of time,  space,  or
attention preclude the possibility of studying both.  A suitable  answer
depends  upon the  aims of  the  teacher.  I  can  imagine  a  wonderful
course on constitutional law that gives priority to Taney's opinion, and
I can also imagine a wonderful course that gives priority to Douglass's
speech.  I would be likely to  give priority  to Taney's opinion on  two
grounds.  The first has to do with the academic  division  of labor.  My
marginal  intellectual  advantage  over colleagues  in  other parts  of the
university  stems  from  my  specialized  training  in  the  understanding
and  manipulation  of judicial  texts.  I  can  probably  best allocate  the
fruits of that advantage to law school students by focusing my energies
primarily  on such  texts while using other materials  as supplementary
aids.  The second  reason has to do with my impression of the relative
social significance  of various  documents  and  my  choice  to focus  the
attention  of  my  students  primarily  on  those  things  of  greatest
consequence.  Horrible  though it was, Taney's  opinion has  exercised
more  influence  than  Douglass's  speech  on  the  American
constitutional  regime and is thus a more important document  for law
students to know.  Underlying  this pedagogical judgment is my sense
that of the various  types  of canonicity,  the  cultural  literacy  canon  is
the most appropriate for a teacher to embrace.  According to  Balkin
and  Levinson,  the  cultural  literacy  canon  is  constituted  by  "the
materials  that  any  educated  person  should  know  about  in  order  to
participate  in  and  contribute  to  serious  general  discussions  about
American  law. 31  For purposes  of a serious analysis  of the secession
crisis,  Taney's  opinion  is  even  more  crucial  to  know  about  than
Douglass's great speech.
The fact is, however, that a teacher is seldom, if ever, faced with the
stark  choice of discussing  one text to  the total  exclusion of another.
Usually  teachers  are  in  a  position  to  discuss  several  texts  at  once,
though they give  priority to some over others.  To  throw  useful light
on  classic  legal  texts,  teachers  should  consider  assigning  stories,
poems,  and  novels.  The  two  classic  texts  concerning  the  federal
constitutional  propriety  of  de jure racial  segregation  are  Plessy  v.
Ferguson3 2 and  Brown  v. Board of Education:. 3'  Both  are  essential
texts  in  any good  course  on race relations  law  in the  United  States.
Neither, however, reflects vividly what segregation actually meant as a
31.  Id  at 977.
32.  163 U.S. 537 (1896).
33.  347 U.S. 483  (1954).
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matter  of  day-to-day  lived  experience.  A  useful  supplement  that
performs  this  task  admirably  is Richard  Wright's  collection  of short
stories,  Uncle Tom's Children.4  Another type  of text that should  be
considered  for inclusion  is  music.  For  example,  one  way of  vividly
illustrating the change in black consciousness  reflected and  nourished
by  the  successful  campaign  of litigation  against  de jure segregation
would be to play in a  classroom Louis Armstrong's  despairing  1930s
rendition  of What Did I Do to Be So Black and Blue and contrast it to
James Brown's  exuberant  1960s rendition  of Say It Loud, I'm Black
and I'm Proud.
My  second  suggestion  is  that  law  school  teachers  focus  more
attention than they currently do on lawmaking  institutions other than
the  courts. 35   One  cannot,  for  example,  obtain  an  adequate
understanding  of the Reconstruction  constitutional  amendments  and
civil  rights  legislation  by  viewing  them  solely  through  the  lens  of
Supreme  Court decisions.  Teachers  of race  relations  law, and  other
subjects  as well, should revisit the debates held in Congress  and state
legislatures  to grasp  the  political  and  social  circumstances  that  gave
rise  to  these enactments  and  affected  their  design.  For example,  in
evaluating  provisions  enacted,  it  helps  to  know  about  proposals
rejected.  In considering  the propriety of official racial distinctions in
light of the Fourteenth Amendment, it helps to know that the Thirty-
ninth  Congress  rejected  a  proposed  Fourteenth  Amendment  that
would  have  expressly  prohibited  the  making  of  racial  distinctions. 3
Similarly,  to  understand  adequately  the  Fifteenth  Amendment,  it
helps  to  know  that  Congress  rejected  a  version  that  would  have
provided citizens  with a right to vote and instead embraced a far more
limited  provision  which  merely  provides  a right  to  be  free of  racial
exclusions from the franchise.37
Another source  of lawmaking  to which  scholars  of race  relations
law ought to devote more attention is the Executive  Branch.  Balkin
and  Levinson  are  right  to  decry  the  marginalization  of  Abraham
Lincoln  in  the  legal  academic  canon. 38   Regrettable  too  is  the
marginalization of Andrew Johnson,  Lincoln's  successor and  a fierce
opponent  of the nation's first federal  civil rights act,  and indeed,  the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Johnson's veto message  of the Civil Rights
Act  of  1866  is  a  document  particularly  worthy  of  inclusion  in  the
34.  Richard Wright,  Uncle Tom's Children (Harper & Row 1965)  (1940).
35.  This, too, echoes a point made by Balkin and Levinson, supra note 30, at 1003-
04.  A somewhat  dated  text that is  attentive to  the need  to  take  into account,  at  the
state and  federal levels,  all lawmaking agencies,  including organs of propaganda  and
scholarship that regulate public opinion, is The Civil Rights Record:  Black Americans
and the Law, 1849-1970, at viii (Richard Bardolph ed.,  1970).
36.  See Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind  Constitution 67 (1992).
37.  See  William  Gillette,  The  Right  to  Vote:  Politics  and  the  Passage  of  the
Fifteenth Amendment 46-78 (1969).
38.  See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 30, at 1016.
[Vol. 68 1994RA CE RELATIONS LA W
canon  of race relations  law.  Commenting  upon the  provision of the
Act,  which  attempted  to  bestow  citizenship  upon  all  native-born
Americans  regardless  of  race  or  previous  condition  of  servitude,
Johnson objected that such a policy "proposes  a discrimination against
large numbers of intelligent, worthy, and  patriotic foreigners,  and  in
favor  of  the  negro."39  Commenting  upon  the  provision  of  the  Act
which mandated  that states permit  all  persons  to contract,  sue,  own
property,  and  give  evidence  on  the  same  terms  as  whites,  Johnson
objected  that  it sought to "establish,  for  the security  of the colored
race  safeguards  which  go  infinitely  beyond  any  that  the  General
Government  has  ever  provided  for  the  white  race.  In  fact,  the
distinction of race and color is, by the [Act],  made to operate  in favor
of  the  colored  and  against  the  white  race."'  These  comments,  so
strikingly resonant of contemporary struggles over affirmative  action,
indicate  that  the  current  debate  has  a  longer  lineage  than  is  often
supposed.  Johnson's  comments  also  suggest  the  alacrity  with  which
some  representatives  of  the  white  majority  charge  that  measures
seeking racial equality for long-oppressed racial minorities are instead
illegitimate ventures into racial favoritism.
Third, I suggest that constructors  of the canon of race relations  law
focus more attention than heretofore upon certain significant silences
in the law.  In addition to teaching, or at least alerting students to the
presence  of,  the  huge  amount  of  constitutional,  statutory,  and
administrative  law that regulates race relations, a good  course on the
subject should  also note  and explore  important lacunae.  Silence  can
be  as  important  as  noise  in  law,  as  in  life.  The  virtual  absence  of
"noise"-law-regarding  the  rape  of  enslaved  black  women,  for
example, speaks volumes about the brutal reality of slavery; it signals
that, for  the  most part, legal  regimes  left  slave  women  unprotected
against  sexual  violence.  Similarly,  the  absence  of  a  federal  anti-
lynching  law  speaks  volumes  about  the  tenor  of  race  relations
between the 1890s and the  1920s,  a period during which  hundreds  of
blacks  were  lynched  annually  under  the  tolerant  gaze  of  a  largely
indifferent public.  These silences need to be recognized and explored.
Another  type of silence that warrants more attention  is that which
stems from the apparent desire of decisionmakers  to ignore  the racial
element of a controversy  even when  that element  is,  in fact, a  major
presence  in the controversy.  Two  examples  of this  phenomenon  are
Bailey  v.  Alabama 4  and Frank v.  Mangum.4 -  Bailey  brought  into
question the validity of a state law that criminalized  breaching a labor
contract  when  the  employee  failed  to  repay  an  advance  on  wages.
39.  See  Cong.  Globe,  39th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  1857,  1858  (1866)  (message  from
President Andrew Johnson).
40.  Id. at 1859.
41.  219 U.S. 219 (1911).
42.  237 U.S. 309 (1915).
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Racial  sentiments  played  a  key  role  in  the  enactment  and
administration of this statute-its purpose and effect was to intimidate
black labor.  In striking down the statute, however, the Court went out
of  its  way  to  avoid  mentioning  the  racial  aspect  of  the  case.43
Similarly,  racial  sentiments  played  a  key  role  in  the  miscarriage  of
justice that led  to  the rape  conviction and  later, the lynching  of Leo
Frank."  Accused of sexually abusing and murdering a white Christian
teenager  in  the  pencil  factory  he  managed,  Frank's  Jewishness
provoked  a  massive outpouring  of anti-semitic fear, resentment,  and
hatred that transformed  his "trial"  into a spectacle.  The prosecution
of Leo Frank  marked  a  high-point  in  the  expression  of  anti-Jewish
prejudice  in  America.  Yet,  in reading  the  Supreme  Court  decision
that denied habeas corpus relief to Frank4-a  major landmark in the
history of the  great writ-one would  never  know  that  anti-semitism
had anything to do with the defendant's predicament.  Silence of this
sort  and  the  reasons  for  it  warrant  notice  and  greater  study  in
investigations of race relations law.
A  fourth  suggestion  is  that  teachers  of race  relations  law  revisit
subjects that were once significant but that are now largely unknown.
An example  is  the caselaw  that arose  from  the enforcement  of anti-
miscegenation  statutes.46  Over  the  course  of  three  hundred  years,
some  forty-one  colonies,  territories,  or  states  prohibited  marriage
across  racial  lines.  This  generated  an  extraordinary  array  of
fascinating cases in which judges had to answer questions such as: For
purposes  of  deciding  whether  a  couple  was  lawfully  married,  how
should  a judge determine  whether  a  man or  woman  was  "black"  or
"white?"  In  a jurisdiction  prohibiting  interracial  marriage,  should  a
judge  enforce  a  will  in  which  a  white  man  bequeathed  all  of  his
property by deed of gift to his black mistress?  What should happen if
an interracial couple  married in a state that permitted  their union and
then moved to a state that prohibited miscegenation?
The law  created  by  these  questions  has largely  disappeared  from
legal  academic  consciousness,  though  some  of  this  law  is  being
reconsidered  because  of its relevance  to heated  struggles today  over
same-sex marriage.47  Virtually all that remains is the aptly titled case,
43.  See Alexander  N. Bickel  & Benno C. Schmidt,  Jr.,  9  History of the Supreme
Court  of the United  States: The Judiciary  and  Responsible  Government  1910-21,  at
820-24 (1984).
44.  See generally Leonard  Dinnerstein, The  Leo  Frank  Case  (1968)  (reviewing
background to the case).
45.  See Frank,  237 U.S. at 345.
46.  See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying  text.
47.  See, e.g., David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage
and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. Pub. L. 201, 204 (1998)  (criticizing the analogy
of  anti-miscegenation  laws  to  statutes  proscribing  same-sex  marriages);  Andrew
Koppelman,  Same-Sex Marriage,  Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 Tex. L.  Rev.
921,  962-75  (1998)  (examining  the  public  policy  implications  in  the  refusal  to
recognize same-sex  marriages under the Defense of Marriage  Act).
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Loving v.  Virginia,'  in  which  the federal  Supreme  Court  belatedly
invalidated anti-miscegenation laws.49  It is possible that a scholar who
is  familiar  with  the  caselaw  generated  by  enforcement  of  the  anti-
miscegenation  laws  would  choose  to  forgo  any  investigation  of this
area insofar as it no longer gives rise to live legal disputes and  insofar
as  there are other  subjects  that are,  on balance,  more  worthwhile  to
study.  It  is  also  likely,  however,  that  for  many  scholars,
inattentiveness  to  prohibitions  on  interracial  marriage  reflects  not  a
conscious  decision  respecting  pedagogical  priorities  but  mere
ignorance;  many scholars,  particularly  those  born during or after  the
Civil  Rights  Revolution,  are  simply  unaware  of the  human  misery
caused  by anti-miscegenation  statutes.  Those who  become  aware  of
this facet of race relations law may decide that, given scarcities of time
and  energy,  they are better  off focusing  attention  on  other matters.
An informed  decision, however,  cannot be  made without  knowledge
of this "lost" subject.  Moreover, after gaining familiarity with it, some
scholars may  find that the anti-miscegenation  caselaw  is surprisingly
relevant to contemporary concerns and therefore  worthy of attention,
even at the cost of spending less time on other matters.
Kindred to the problem of the lost subject is the problem of the lost
case.  Even  within  well-known,  deeply-researched  subjects,  such  as
voting rights, there exist neglected cases which scholars ought to make
more  prominent.  At  the  top  of the  list  of such  cases  is  Giles  v.
Harris, 5  a  federal  Supreme  Court  decision  that  should  be  essential
reading in the canon of race relations law."'  In Giles, in  an opinion  by
48.  388 U.S. 1 (1967).
49.  See id. at 12.  Mention of Loving offers an opportunity to combat the tendency
to  focus  excessively  on  the  federal  Supreme Court  in  derogation  of state  supreme
courts  and  other  lawmaking  bodies.  The  Supreme  Court  confronted  anti-
miscegenation  laws in  1967 near  the  end  of the  Civil  Rights  Revolution  only after
scores  of  state  legislatures  had  repealed  their  prohibitions  against  interracial
marriage.  Nineteen years  before Chief Justice  Earl  Warren's opinion  for the federal
Supreme  Court  in  Loving,  Judge  Roger  Traynor  authored  an  opinion  for  the
Supreme  Court of California that invalidated  on  federal constitutional  grounds that
state's anti-miscegenation  law. See Perez v. Lippold,  198 P.2d 17.46 (Cal.  1948).
50.  189 U.S. 475  (1903).
51.  I  am not claiming  to have  discovered  or rediscovered  Giles.  For  valuable
discussions of the historiography of the case, see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-
Democracy,  and the Canon (forthcoming 2000)  (constitutional commentary). See also
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Race Racism and  American Law 94,516 (1973)  (discussing Giles);
Bickel  & Schmidt, supra note 43, at  924-27  (same): Owen  M.  Fiss,  8 History of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, 1883-
1910, at 372-79,  384, 391  (1993)  (same).  I am  merely noting that  the case  lacks  the
salience  that it should  have  and  urging  that arbiters of the race  relations  law  canon
redress this neglect.
A  contributing  reason,  perhaps,  for  Giles's obscurity  is  that  the  United  States
Supreme Court has dropped  it from its own  historical memory.  In South Carolina  r.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966),  the Court presents a short history of efforts to evade
or nullify the Fifteenth Amendment on its way to justifying as policy and upholding as
a matter of constitutional  law challenged provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,  the Court assumed that the State
of Alabama  had embarked  on a racial  policy to exclude blacks  from
the ballot box in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.  Nonetheless,
the  Court  declined  to  grant  equitable  relief  to  the  plaintiffs.
According to Justice Holmes, the complaint in Giles:
imports that the great mass  of the white population intends to keep
the  blacks  from  voting.  To meet  such  an  intent  something  more
than ordering the plaintiff's  name to be  inscribed  upon the  [lists of
eligible voters] will be needed.  If the conspiracy and the intent exist,
a  name  on  a  piece  of paper  will  not  defeat them.  Unless  we  are
prepared  to  supervise  the  voting  in  that  State  by  officers  of  the
court, it seems  to us that all that the plaintiff could get from equity
would  be  an empty  form.  Apart from  damages  to the  individual,
relief from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people
of  a  State  and  the  State  itself, must  be  given  by  them  or  by  the
legislative and political department of the government of the United
States.
52
Written at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Giles decision
sounded  themes that resonate  loudly at the opening of the twentieth-
first century  in ongoing  struggles over race relations, federalism,  and
judicial power.  Yet, as Professor Richard H. Pildes writes, "Giles has
been  airbrushed  out  of  the  constitutional  canon."53  As  one  of  the
most  notable  Supreme  Court  decisions  in  American  constitutional
history,  a  ruling  fully  as  regrettable  as  Plessy  v.  Ferguson5  or
Korematsu v.  United States,55 the consequential  egregiousness of  Giles
should be much better known than it is.
My  fifth  suggestion  regarding  the  canon  of  race  relations  law
scholarship  stems from  a basic  question  concerning  the  contours  of
the  field: What  should  be  the  racial coverage  of race  relations  law?
As things currently stand, the black-white  racial frontier continues  to
dominate the field for a variety of reasons.  White-black  racial conflict
In the course  of presenting this history, the Court relates its own history  in the voting
rights  area.  The  Court,  however,  cites  only  those  decisions  in which  it invalidates
efforts  aimed  at excluding  blacks  from the  franchise.  See id. at  311-12.  It reduces  to
invisibility  decisions  such  as  Giles or  Grovey  v.  Townsend, 295  U.S.  45,  55  (1935)
(insulating  from constitutional  attack  a version  of the white  primary),  overruled by
Smith  v.  Allwright,  321  U.S.  649  (1944),  rulings  in  which  the  Court  itself  became
complicit  in  nullifying  the  Fifteenth  Amendment.  Perhaps  the  Court  intended  its
presentation  of its  history  to  further  the  struggle  for racial  justice  by  inventing  a
tradition  of unbroken judicial  solicitude  for the  rights of African  Americans  at  the
ballot box.  Regardless of the motivation  or strategy,  scholars need  to be aware that
they  cannot  depend  upon  the  Court  to  describe  thoroughly  its  own  institutional
history.  This is an important matter  since teachers  frequently  use cases  as historical
narratives.  It  may  be that  one  reason  Giles has  dropped  from the  legal  academic
canon is that it was dropped by the Justices from the Supreme Court's own canon.
52. Giles, 189 U.S. at 488.
53.  Pildes, supra note 51.
54.  163 U.S.  537 (1896).
55.  323 U.S. 214 (1944).
[Vol. 68 1998RACE RELATIONS LA W
has had more of an effect  on broadly  applicable  law  than  any  other
racial  conflict.  White-red  racial  conflict  has  also  generated  a
tremendous amount of law, much of which has been gathered together
and  organized  under the  rubric of Federal  Indian  Law.'  All  three
branches  of the federal government,  however, have  long  treated  the
Indian  tribes  as  a  sui  generis  group  for  whom  unique  laws  are
appropriate.  This sharply  limits the applicability  of decisions  in  that
area  of the law and  concomitantly  limits interest  in that  area.  If the
Fourteenth Amendment had been limited to the protection  of blacks,
it would  be  of far  less concern  to far fewer  people  than  it  is  today.
That Federal  Indian law has been effectively segregated  doctrinally in
courts  and in law  schools both reflects  and  explains, at  least  in  part,
the isolation of Indian affairs from major currents of intellectual life in
legal  academia,  including  courses  and  books  on  race  relations  law.
The  splitting  off  of  Federal  Indian  law  from  race  relations  law  in
general  is  a development  and  practice that ought  to be  reconsidered
and undone.  Considerable  enlightenment  about  the (mis)-treatment
of  Indians  and  other  non-white  peoples  could  be  generated  by
systematically  exploring  the  differences  in  treatment  accorded  to
these various groups.  For example,  at the same time that federal  and
state governments imposed racial separation  on blacks, they imposed
racial  assimilation on  Indians.  This  is  an  important juxtaposition  to
which more  attention should  be  called.  It suggests  the variety  with
which racial prejudice  can express itself and suggests,  too, the variety
of  racial  ideologies  that  vulnerable,  racial  minorities  have  had  to
confront.  At  the  same  time  that  many  influential  decisionmakers
believed  that  Indians  could  be  "saved"  through  a  process  of
assimilationist  whitening,  these  same  decisionmakers  saw  blacks  as
irredeemably  alien, incapable  of assimilation,  and  thus fit only  for  a
social existence safely distant from white society.
Alexis  de  Toqueville's  comparative  focus  on  whites,  blacks,  and
Indians,  what  he  called  "the  three  races  of America,"  enriched  the
bright and harsh light that he shed on race relations law in Democracy
in America."  Writing in the  1830s, De Tocqueville demonstrated  an
admirable  comprehensiveness  in examining  the  inter-relationship  of
those three races. 5"  Subsequently,  however, many  "races,"  including
"yellow"  people  from  China, Japan,  and  other  Asian  countries  and
"brown"  people  from  Mexico,  the  Philippines,  Hawaii,  and  other
56.  The  most  significant  scholarly  engagement  in  this  field  remains  Felix  S.
Cohen's  Handbook of Federal Indian Law  (1942),  a  text  that  is  canonical  along
several dimensions.
57.  See 1  Alexis  de Tocqueville,  Democracy  in  America  337-42  (Henry  Reeve
trans., Colonial Press rev. ed. 1900) (1835).
58.  See  Randall  Kennedy,  Tocqueville  and  Racial  Conflict  in  America:  A
Comment, 11 Harv. BlackLetter J. 145,  152 (1994).
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places that have been gripped by American imperialism  have peopled
the United States.
States  and  the  federal  government  in  the  United  States  have
subjected  people  of  color  to  all  manner  of  racial  abuses  that  have
generated  controversies  that have  spilled into legislatures  and  courts
and given rise to a large body of law that ought to be part of the canon
of race relations  law.  This  is  a relatively  uncontroversial  point;  it  is
hard  to imagine any course substantially concerned with race relations
law that would fail to include for discussion  Yick  Wo  v.  Hopkins9  or
Korematsu v. United States.6  At the same time, there is discernible, in
legal  academia  and  beyond,  a  growing  impatience  with  analyses  of
race  relations  law  that  marginalize  the  history,  participation,  and
concerns  of people  of color  other than  the  white,  black,  and  red.6'
This dissatisfaction is justified. 62  The United States is not simply  a tri-
racial society; it is a profoundly multi-racial  society.  Attending  to that
fact  poses  yet more  problems  for  teachers  and  writers  who  already
face  daunting  dilemmas  of  selectivity.  That  fact  also  indicates,
however,  the  extraordinary  possibilities  latent  in  the  field  of  race
relations law-possibilities that await realization in the years ahead.
My  sixth  suggestion  is  that  scholars  of  race  relations  law,  and
scholars  in general,  ought  to canonize  materials  and  techniques  that
clarify  what  actually  happened  as  a  consequence  of a  constitutional
amendment,  statutory  provision,  or judicial  or  administrative  ruling.
Too  often,  discussions  of  legal  developments  proceed  on  the
assumption  that  realities  mirror  formal  changes  in  rules.  To  some
extent,  reality  does  change  whenever  a  lawmaking  body  renders  a
decision.  Even  if  onlookers  ignore  the  decision,  the  ruling  itself
changes  the  contours  of  law  and  thus  effectuates  a  reform,  albeit
limited, that is worthy of notice.  To that extent, no decision is totally
hollow, and every decision is somewhat significant.  Worthy of notice,
too, is the degree to which  social practices change as a consequence  of
judicial,  legislative,  or  executive  lawmaking.  Too  little  study  is
devoted  to this inquiry.  To be sure, some investigation  of the actual
social  consequences  of  lawmaking  have  been  undertaken.63  Even
59.  118 U.S. 356  (1886).
60.  323 U.S. 214 (1944).
61.  See generally, e.g.,  Symposium, Race and Remedy in a Multicultural  Society, 47
Stan.  L. Rev. 819  (1995)  (especially Deborah Ramirez,  Multicultural Empowerment:
It's Not  Just Black  and  White  Anymore,  47  Stan.  L.  Rev.  957)  (examining  the
"emergence  of a  new  form of racial  tension"  due  to an  increase  in  racial diversity);
LatCrit: Latinas/os and the Law: A Joint Symposium by  California Law Review and
La  Raza  Law Journal, 10  La  Raza  L.J.  1  (1998),  85  Cal.  L.  Rev.  1087  (1997)
(encouraging  "a  LatCrit  consciousness,  community  and  literature  within  the
contemporary  legal culture of the United States").
62.  I have  been  insufficiently  attentive  to the  full  panoply  of race  matters  in  my
own  work.  See Viet  D.  Dinh,  Races, Crime, and the  Law,  111  Harv.  L.  Rev.  1289,
1289-90 (1998)  (reviewing Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law).
63.  See,  e.g.,  Clear and  Convincing  Evidence:  Measurement  of Discrimination  in
2000 [Vol. 68RACE RELATIONS LA W
when they exist, however,  such studies receive  too  little attention  in
the legal academic canon.
III.
I  turn  now  to  the  question:  With  what  political  and  pedagogical
attitude should  a course on race relations be taught?  I  approach  this
inquiry with some  trepidation  because  my  own  attitude-or  at  least
my perceived  attitude-has  been harshly  criticized.  In  The Strange
Career of Randall Kennedy, Professor Derrick  Bell  expresses  regret
that I became his successor as  the teacher of the basic course on race
relations law at Harvard  Law School.' 4 He maintains that I started off
my teaching  and scholarly  career  on  the right  track, stating that  my
"first few articles  were stunning models of racial advocacy,"''  "hard-
hitting writing filled with bite and passion."6  They seemed to foretell,
he  continued,  that  I  "would  become  a  powerful  voice  for  a  people
whose expectations that the civil rights era would gain its racial justice
goals were fading fast."'67  But then, in his view, I took a wrong turn.  I
became  "impartial"  and  all  too ready  to criticize  publicly  righteous
positions embraced by champions of civil rights.'  According to Bell, I
seemed  to have forgotten whose side I  was on and comported myself
intellectually  "in  ways  that-whether  intended  or  not-serve  to
America  (Michael  Fix &  Raymond  J.  Struyk  eds.,  1993)  (publishing  findings  from
auditing studies of discrimination  in housing, lending, employment,  and other areas);
Jesse  H. Choper,  Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual
Constitutional Rights, 83  Mich.  L. Rev.  1, 7-14  (1984)  (outlining  the  difficulties  in
measuring the effects of a court's holdings on society); John J.  Donahue III & Peter
Siegelman,  The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination  Litigation, 43  Stan.
L. Rev.  983, 984  (1991)  (citing  "a  need  for reevaluating  employment  discrimination
policy"); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change,  and the Civil Rights Movement,
80  Va.  L. Rev.  7,  10  (1994)  (arguing  that  social,  political,  and  economic  factors
contributed to a change  in race  relations);  Michael  J.  Klarman,  Rethinking the Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82  Va.  L.  Rev.  1, 6-7  (1996)  (arguing  the
influence  of various  factors on  the transformation  of constitutional  law);  Kenneth J.
Melilli,  Batson  in  Practice: What  We  Have Learned about Batson  and Peremptory
Challenges,  71  Notre Dame L. Rev. 447,  484-502  (1996)  (examining the many  factors
utilized  in  peremptory  challenges);  Michael  J.  Raphael  &  Edward  J.  Ungvarsky,
Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations Under Batson v.  Kentucky,  27  U. Mich.  J.L
Reform 229, 235-75 (1993)  (analyzing  cases dealing with preemptor)' challenges after
Batson and  concluding  that  prosecutors  actually  preempt  jurors  based  on  race
although they provide another reason).
64.  See  Derrick  Bell,  The  Strange  Career of Randall Kennedy,  New  Politics,
Summer 1998, at 55.
65.  Id- at 56.  The articles to which he refers are Randall  L  Kennedy, McCleskey
v. Kemp: Race, Capital  Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101  Harv.  L  Rev.  1388
(1988);  Randall  Kennedy,  Persuasion and Distrust:  A  Comnent on  tie Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1327  (1986);  Randall  Kennedy, Race Relations Law
and the Tradition of Celebration. The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86  Colum.  L  Rev.
1622 (1986). See Bell, supra note 64, at 66-67.
66.  Bell, supra note 64, at 66.
67.  Id  at 56.
68.  Id
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comfort  many  whites  and  distress  blacks."69  "Disgruntled  students
complained,"  Bell  reports,  "that  Kennedy  spent  more  time
challenging  and  even  denigrating  civil  rights  positions  than  he  did
analyzing the  continuing practices  and policies of discrimination  that
made those policies, whatever their shortcomings, necessary."70
Bell's  critique  raises  a  variety  of  fundamental  issues.  First,  by
charging  that  I  have  abandoned  the  "advocacy  orientation"  of  the
course that he bequeathed  to me, Bell implicitly  asserts that a course
on race relations law-and perhaps all courses-should  be taught with
an  advocacy  orientation.  Unfortunately,  Professor  Bell  neglects  to
define  clearly what he means  by advocacy  orientation.  I believe  that
what he means to refer  to is  an attitude  of engagement  in which  the
teacher  is seeking to  change  the world, at least  a bit,  by shaping  the
perspectives  of  his  or her  students.  An  advocacy  orientation  is  a
commitment  to  challenge  unjust  aspects  of  the  status  quo  and
recommend  needed  reforms,  no matter how  radical.  If  this  is  what
Professor  Bell  means  by an  "advocacy  orientation"-and  I  think  it
is-then he and  I agree on a fundamental  point.  Professors  in  every
law school class are constantly, indeed unavoidably, taking  a position,
either  implicitly  or  explicitly,  with  respect  to  the  legitimacy  or
illegitimacy  of  the  system  of  law  they  are  attempting  to  analyze.
Professor  Bell  wants  his  colleagues  to  be  conscious  of  the  political
stances  that  they  take  in  their  books,  articles,  lectures,  and  other
pedagogical  tasks,  including letters of recommendation  and votes for
tenure.  I  applaud  his realistic  appraisal  of the unavoidably  political
elements  of  pedagogy  and  his  insistence  on  a  high  degree  of
ideological  self-awareness.  Where,  then,  do  we  disagree  in  ways
relevant to constructing a course on race relations law?  Conflicts arise
in a variety of areas, three of which are particularly important.
First,  Bell  is  supremely  confident  that  he  knows  what  policy
positions  are  the correct  civil  rights positions  to  adopt  and  thus  the
69.  Id. at 57.  To  preclude  charges  that  I  have  quoted  Professor  Bell  "out  of
context,"  I shall offer a full paragraph of his comments:
Kennedy,  like Thurgood  Marshall,  is a contrarian.  He  loves  to  argue and
play the devil's advocate.  This is a useful talent in the classroom  and is quite
helpful  in fine-tuning  litigation  strategies.  Justice  Marshall,  though,  never
forgot whose side he was on, particularly  in public proclamations  as opposed
to private  discourse.  In  public, he was  the ultimate  advocate  for the  black
cause as reflected in his civil rights career and his judicial  tenure.  Kennedy,
on the other hand,  is quite willing to take his differences  with  black people
public  in  ways  that-whether  intended  or  not-serve  to  comfort  many
whites  and  distress  blacks.  It  is  not  that  his  criticisms  are  new.  White
conservatives  have  made  similar  arguments  and  worse.  It  is  that  he  is
relinquishing a much needed  advocacy role and taking positions that render
him an apologist [for aspects of a system]  that are less overtly  racist than in
earlier times but no less ominous in the threat they pose for all blacks.
Id. (footnote omitted).
70.  Id. at 56.
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ones to urge his students to follow.  Because Bell is so confident, he is
impatient  with  others  who  lack  his  certitude.  He  displays  this
impatience  by  routinely  portraying  opponents  as  either  racists  or
opportunists.  I lack his certitude and believe that there is good reason
to  be  open-minded  about  a  variety  of  hotly-contested  debates
regarding  race  relations  policy.  I  therefore  believe  that  a  well-
constructed course  on  race  relations  law should  provide  room  for a
patient, tolerant exploration of alternative resolutions to the dilemmas
we face.
It  is  ironic,  in  the  extreme,  for  me  to  be  advocating  a  patient,
tolerant  exploration  of  alternative  positions  in  race  relations  in
response to Professor Bell.  After all, one of his signal contributions to
the legal academic literature is Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals
and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation," which sharply
questioned the propriety of civil rights attorneys pressing for one sort
of remedy  in school  desegregation  cases  while  their  putative  clients
seemed to prefer  a different sort  of remedy.  "The  time has come,"
Professor Bell concluded, "for civil rights lawyers  to end their single-
minded commitment to racial balance, a goal which, standing alone, is
increasingly  inaccessible  and  all  too often educationally  impotent."'
Some  circles  considered  Bell's article  heretical. 3  Indeed,  to some,
unfortunately,  it  was  cause  for  political  and  intellectual
excommunication.  Wherever one stands on the merits  of the dispute,
however,  the important point here is that Bell was  a  participant  in a
bona fide dispute between bona fide champions of African American
advancement over the best strategy to pursue.  Then, as well as  now,
properly  determining  how  best  to  proceed  took  more  than  an
emotional commitment to "doing the right thing."  It also required an
intellectual  investment to figure out what constituted doing the right
thing, a task that is even more complicated  today  than it was in  1973
when Professor  Bell published  the first  edition  of Race, Racism and
American Law, a wonderful compendium of source material for which
all scholars owe him a large intellectual debt.
A properly constructed  course on race relations  law at the dawn of
the  twenty-first  century  should  provide  students  with  educational
materials  and  psychological  space  so  that  they  can  determine  for
themselves appropriate responses to a host of vexing dilemmas.  Some
champions of African American  advancement,  for example, maintain
that for purposes  of fully enforcing  anti-discrimination  norms,  black
workers within majority-white unions should be able to negotiate  with
or challenge  employers  independently  of their  union  bureaucracies.
Their  fear,  of  course,  is  that  the  officials  of  such  unions  will  be
71.  85 Yale L.J.  470 (1976).
72  Id.  at 516.
73.  See Nathaniel  R. Jones, Correspondence,  School Desegregation,  86 Yale  L.J.
378,381  (1976).
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insufficiently  aggressive  in protecting  the interests  of black  workers.
Arguing in favor of this position, a dissenting judge declared in  1974
that
TO  LEAVE  NON-WHITES  AT THE MERCY  OF  WHITES  IN
THE  PRESENTATION  OF  NON-WHITE  CLAIMS  WHICH
ARE  ADMITTEDLY  ADVERSE  TO  THE  WHITES  WOULD
BE  A  MOCKERY  OF  DEMOCRACY....  IN  PRESENTING
NON-WHITE  ISSUES  NON-WHITES  CANNOT,  AGAINST
THEIR  WILL,  BE  RELEGATED  TO  WHITE  SPOKESMEN,
MIMICKING  BLACK  MEN.  THE  DAY  OF THE  MINSTREL
SHOW IS OVER.74
When the ruling to which this judge dissented was  appealed  to the
Supreme  Court of the United States, the National Association  for the
Advancement  of  Colored  People  ("NAACP"),  the  single  most
influential black defense organization in American history, backed his
stance.  The  Supreme  Court,  however,  rejected  this  stance.  More
significantly, for  our purposes, the Justice who wrote  the opinion for
the Court was none other than Justice Thurgood  Marshall, "Mr.  Civil
Rights."  Disagreeing with the NAACP, Justice Marshall believed that
a  correct  reading  of the  applicable  labor  law  required  deference  to
union control over  the presentation  of worker grievances-including
complaints  by  black  workers  of  racial  discrimination.  He  also
believed that black workers in unions would generally be better off by
playing within  the  established  groundrules  of  the  labor  movement,
even if this meant subordinating  their special grievances  to the overall
goals  of  the  unions  representing  them. 75  That  Marshall,  America's
first black Supreme  Court justice, wrote  the Court's opinion  does not
make  that  ruling  right  or  even  necessarily  in  the  best  interest  of
blacks.  It is  safe to say, though,  that Thurgood  Marshall  would  not
favor the perpetuation of a minstrel show.
There  are  many  other  areas  in which  people  who  are  thoroughly
committed to advancing the interests of blacks disagree over how best
to  proceed.  Some  champions  of  African  American  uplift  urge
rejection of the integrationist approach to racial equity in educational
opportunities  that prevailed during  much of the civil rights era of the
1950s and 1960s.76  Others, however, counsel embracing integrationist
74.  Western  Addition  Community  Org.  v.  NLRB,  485  F.2d  917,  940  (1973)
(Wyzanski, J., dissenting).
75.  See Emporium  Capwell  Co.  v. Western  Addition  Community Org.,  420  U.S.
50,  67-70  (1975).  This  issue  remains  contentious.  See Molly S. McUsic & Michael
Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the Workplace, 82 Iowa  L.  Rev. 1339,
1353 (1997).
76.  See  Bell,  supra note  51,  at  574-605;  Kevin  Brown,  Has the Supreme  Court
Allowed the Cure for De Jure  Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 Cornell  L. Rev.
1,  6 (1992);  Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v.  Fordice: Why
Integrationism Fails  African-Americans Again, 81  Cal.  L. Rev.  1401,  1406-32  (1993).
Some of the sentiments  that nourish  this perspective  have  deep historical  roots. See
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strategies.'  Some champions of black advancement  argue in favor of
seeking  better housing  and  other opportunities  by  encouraging  the
dispersal  of  black  ghetto-dwellers."  Others,  by  contrast,  argue  in
favor  of consolidating  the  strength  of  black  ghettoes  and  bringing
greater opportunities to inner-city blacks where they already  reside.9
Debates  rage  over whether, for  blacks,  it is  better  to elect  as  many
black representatives  as  possible from majority-black  voting  districts
or to more fully spread  the influence  of black voters, even at the  cost
of  sacrificing  dominance  in  a  certain  number  of  voting  districts,"
whether it is better to invest more in  securing public  safety  in high-
crime,  majority-minority  neighborhoods  (even  at  the  cost  of
encroaching upon personal privacy),  or to insist that residents of such
neighborhoods  be  accorded  the  same  degree  of privacy  afforded  to
residents of safer, whiter, more affluent neighborhoods."  whether it is
better to prefer  to place  black  orphaned  children  in  black  adoptive
families  or to stipulate  that such  children  will  be  placed  in  the  first
adoptive home  available, regardless  of race;8  whether  redistributive
W.E. Burghardt DuBois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J.  Negro  Educ.
328, 329  (1935);  Davison  M.  Douglas,  The Limits of Law in Accomplishing Racial
Change: School Segregation in  the  Pre-Brown North, 44  UCLA  L  Rev.  677,  697
(1997).
77.  See, e.g.,  Gary Orfield et al., Dismantling  Desegregation: The Quiet  Reversal
of Brown  v.  Board of Education 345-46  (1996)  (suggesting  ways "to  move  toward
integration").
7&  See, eg., Michael H. Schill  & Susan  M.  Wachter,  The Spatial Bias of Federal
Housing  Law and Policy: Concentrated  Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. Pa. L Rev.
1285,  1328-41  (1995)  (arguing  that enforcing  laws against  discrimination  in  housing
could solve the problem of racial segregation).
79.  See,  e.g.,  John 0.  Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation:
"Hewing a Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair", 143  U.  Pa.  L  Rev.  1233,
1271-72  (1995)  (arguing  that a grassroots approach  from within the  community  may
be a better way to improve the quality of life for people of color).
80.  See  David  Lublin,  The  Paradox  of Representation:  Racial  Gerrymandering
and Minority Interests  in  Congress  87-97  (1997);  Richard  H.  Pildes,  The Politics of
Race, 108  Harv.  L.  Rev.  1359,  1386-89  (1995)  (reviewing  Quiet  Revolution  in  the
South (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)).
81.  Consider the debate  between Tracey Meares  and  Dan Kahan,  both of whom
argue in  favor  of enhancing  police  authority  for  the benefit  of crime-ravaged  and
impoverished  minority communities,  and more traditional  civil libertarians  who  see
enhanced police  power  as  a  likely  menace  to racial  minorities.  Compare Tracey  L
Meares  &  Dan  M.  Kahan,  Urgent  Times:  Policing  and  Rights  in  Inner-City
Communities  3-6 (Joshua Cohen  & Joel  Rogers eds., 1999)  (stating that many inner-
city residents  support  increased  law  enforcement  measures  to  combat  crime),  with
David Cole,  Foreword. Discretion and Discrimination  Reconsidered: A  Response to
the New Criminal  Justice Scholarship,  87 Geo. L.J. 1059,  1062-63 (1999)  (arguing that
the negative effects of aggressive  policing may outweigh  the benefits gained by inner-
city  communities),  and Dorothy  E.  Roberts,  Foreword: Race,  Vagueness, and the
Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance  Policing, 89 J.  Crim.  L  & Criminology  775,
835-36 (1999)  (arguing that vague  loitering laws "reinforce[]  stereotypes  that portray
Blacks  as  lawless  and  legitimate  police  harassment  in  Black  communities,"  thus
eroding "constitutional safeguards against race-based  police abuse").
82.  Some commentators fervently believe that it is in the best interest of orphaned
black children for the state to attempt to place  them for adoption  with black  adults.
2000] 20052006  FORDHAM LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 68
reforms  primarily  animated  by  a  desire  to  help  blacks  are  best
packaged  as race-specific  or race-neutral.83  A course on race relations
law  should  make  clear  that  enlightened,  non-racist  activists, jurists,
and  commentators  can  be  found  on  several  sides  of  these
controversies.  Contrary  to Professor Bell's rhetoric,  these  issues are
not,  forgive  the  expression,  black  and  white.  They  are  multi-
dimensional and should be portrayed, seen, and dealt with as such.
A second broad area of pedagogical conflict between Professor Bell
See James  S.  Bowen,  Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus  Between
Putative Afro-American Family Values and the Best Interests of the Child, 26 J.  Fam.
L. 487,  514-15  (1987);  Cynthia  G. Hawkins-Le6n,  The Indian Child Welfare Act and
the African American  Tribe: Facing the Adoption  Crisis, 36  J.  Fam.  L. 201,  217-18
(1998);  Ruth-Arlene  W.  Howe,  Transracial  Adoption  (TRA):  Old  Prejudices and
Discrimination  Float Under a New  Halo, 6 B.U.  Pub.  Int.  L.J.  409,  417-18  (1997).
Other commentators fervently believe that it is a terrible disservice  to black orphans
for the state to attempt to place them for adoption with black adults, given the delays
and other problems that such efforts  cause.  See Elizabeth  Bartholet, Family  Bonds:
Adoption and  the  Politics of Parenting  92-93  (1993);  Elizabeth Bartholet,  Nobody's
Children:  Abuse  and  Neglect,  Foster  Drift,  and  the  Adoption  Alternative  135-40
(1999);  Kim  Forde-Mazrui,  Note,  Black  Identity and  Child Placement: The  Best
Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 Mich. L. Rev.  925, 966-67 (1994);  Randall
Kennedy, Orphans of Separatism: The Painfid Politics  of Transracial  Adoption, Am.
Prospect, Spring 1994, at 38,38-42.
83.  Among those on the leftwards  side of the political spectrum support for  race-
specific reforms is broad and intense.  See, e.g., Christopher Edley, Jr., Not All  Black
and White:  Affirmative Action, Race, and American  Values 278  (1996)  (supporting,
maintaining, and reforming a national affirmative action policy); Charles R. Lawrence
III & Mari J. Matsuda, We Won't Go Back: Making the  Case for Affirmative  Action
1 (1997)  (defending  affirmative  action as  an affirmation of democratic  values);  Paul
Butler,  Affirmative Action and the Criminal  Law,  68  U.  Colo.  L. Rev.  841,  843-44
(1997)  (arguing  for  race-based  affirmative  action  in  criminal  law);  A.  Leon
Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with Devastating
Racial  Consequences, 62  Fordham  L.  Rev.  1593,  1644  (1994)  (arguing  that  the
Supreme  Court's  rejection  of majority-minority  districts  is  fundamentally  flawed);
Duncan  Kennedy,  A  Cultural Pluralist Case for  Affirmative  Action  in  Legal
Academia, 1990 Duke L.J. 705, 705  (arguing that "large scale affirmative action would
improve  the  quality  and  increase  the  value  of  legal  scholarship").  There  are
progressives,  however,  who  have  expressed  doubts  about  whether  race-specific
policies  will  broadly  advance  the  interests  of  most  African  Americans.  See,  e.g.,
Randall  Kennedy,  supra note  *,  at  29-135;  William  Julius  Wilson,  The  Truly
Disadvantaged: The Inner City, The Underclass, and Public Policy  115 (1987)  (stating
that race- or ethnicity-based  affirmative  action would  "enhance  the opportunities of
the more advantaged without addressing the problems of the truly disadvantaged").
On  the rightwards  end  of the  political  spectrum  there exists  substantial  literature
that argues that  race-specific social policies, albeit well-intentioned,  negatively  affect
their presumed beneficiaries. See, e.g., Shelby Steele, The Content of Our Character:
A New Vision  of Race  in America  113  (1990)  ("I think  affirmative  action  has shown
itself to be more bad  than good and  that blacks..,  now stand  to lose  more  from  it
than  they  gain.");  Antonin  Scalia,  The Disease as Cure: "In order to  Get Beyond
Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race," 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 147, 156 (opposing
"racial  affirmative  action for reasons  of both  principal  and  practicality");  Glenn  C.
Loury, Beyond Civil Rights, The New Republic,  Oct.  7,  1985,  at 22, 22  (arguing  that
the broad  application of the civil rights strategies to cases of "differential achievement
between blacks and  whites threatens to make  it impossible  for blacks to achieve  full
equality").RACE RELATIONS LAW
and me arises from differing premises concerning  the normative aims
of a  course  on race relations  law.  He  seems to  assume  that  its  aim
should  be to  advance  the interests  of  black  people.  As  I indicated
above, what  actually  constitutes  the best  interests of black  people is
more  contested  and  more  difficult  to  discern  than  Bell's  rhetoric
suggests.  But even  if a  broad  consensus  among  African  Americans
was reached  over what  constituted  the best interest  of black  people,
major difficulties would still loom over an approach,  like Bell's, which
measures the political virtue of any given policy in terms of "Is  it good
for the blacks?"  Blacks, after  all, constitute  only  one portion  of the
American  polity.  What is  good  for that portion  will  likely  often be
good for the whole or good for social justice in general,  but that need
not  always  be  the  case.  The  interests  of  blacks  might  come  into
conflict  with  the  interests  of  other  groups  whose  claims  in  a  given
situation  are more pressing  or weighty  than those  of  blacks.  When
that happens, I see no reason to prefer the position of blacks, just as I
see  no  reason  to  prefer  necessarily  the  position  of  whites,  Jews,
Catholics, or  any other particular  social  group.'  A  good  course  on
race relations  law  in  the United  States  would  show  that  any  group,
like any person, is capable  of perpetrating  racial  harms upon  others.
It  would  show  how  people  of  Chinese  ancestry  have  attempted  to
deflect anti-Asian  animus  by  scapegoating  Indians and  blacks-, "5 how
some  Indians  enslaved  African  Americans  even  as  they  themselves
were being cruelly ousted from their lands by Euro-Americans,6  how
people  of  African  ancestry  have  attempted  to  escape  anti-Black
84.  See Randall  Kennedy, My  Race Problem-And Ours, Atlantic Monthly, May
1997, at 55, 64-65.
85.  In People v.  Hall, 4  Cal.  399,  404-05  (1854),  the  California  Supreme  Court
ruled that state law excluded  Chinese, along with  blacks and Indians, from testifying
against  whites.  In  the course  of  its  decision  the  Court  described  Chinese  as  -[a
people] whose mendacity  is proverbial;  a race...  nature has marked  as inferior, and
who  are incapable  of progress or intellectual  development  beyond  a certain  point."
Id.  at 405.  A prominent  Chinese merchant responded in  the  following terms:  "[The
whites]  have come  to  the  conclusion  that  we Chinese  are  the same  as  Indians  and
Negroes ....  And yet these Indians  know nothing about the relations of society; they
know no mutual respect; they wear neither clothes nor shoes;  they live in wild places
and  [in]  caves."  Charles  J.  McClain,  Jr.,  The  Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in
Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72  Cal.  L  Rev.  529,  550
(1984)  (second  alteration  in  original)  (footnote  omitted).  The  Chinese  merchant
argued, in other words, that it was understandable  to exclude Indians and  blacks from
the witness stand but an injustice to do the same to people of Chinese ancestry.
86.  See  Annie  Heloise  Abel,  The  American  Indian  as  Slaveholder  and
Secessionist  1-5 (University Neb. Press  1992)  (1915);  Theda Perdue,  Slavery  and the
Evolution of Cherokee Society,  1540-1866,  at 38-39,  66  (1979);  Kathryn  E. Holland
Braund,  The Creek Indians, Blacks, and Slavery, 57  J.  S.  Hist.  601.  601-02,  616-18.
(1991);  C.  Calvin  Smith,  The  Oppressed Oppressors: Negro  Slavery  Among  the
Choctaw Indians of Oklahoma, 2  Red  River Valley  Hist.  Rev.  240, 24041  (1975);
William S. Willis, Divide and Rule: Red, White, and Black in the Southeast,  48 J. Negro
Hist. 157, 168-73  (1963).
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animus by scapegoating Indians;'  how Jews have attempted to escape
anti-Semitism  by  scapegoating  Negroes;m  how  some  African
Americans  have  racially-targeted  Korean  Americans; 9  and  how,  of
course, whites  of various ethnicities have  attempted  systematically  to
subordinate blacks and other people's of color.
Professor  Bell  is  really interested  only  in  the last  of these  topics.
For example, when  one  looks up  the key  term  "racism"  in the  third
edition  of Race, Racism and American Law, one  finds  the following
entry: "Racism-See White racism."90  This elliptical  comment stems
from a theory that has, unfortunately, been gaining influence  steadily
over the past thirty years.  Under that theory, blacks and other racially
oppressed  peoples cannot  be  "racist"  because  "racism"  can  only  be
manifested by groups with power.  According to this theory, "racism"
equals prejudice plus power.  According to proponents  of this theory,
blacks  can  be prejudiced,  but blacks  cannot  be  racists  because  they
lack  the  power  to  effectuate  the  prejudices  they  may  harbor.
87.  In  1914,  a  group  of  African  Americans  rightly  objected  to  an  Oklahoma
statute that authorized  railroads  to provide  first  class  service only  to whites.  They
prevailed  in  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,  which  ruled  that  the  statute  in
question  violated  the formal equality  under  which de jure segregation  was justified.
See  McCabe  v.  Atchison,  Topeka  &  Santa  Fe  Ry.,  235  U.S.  151,  161-62  (1914).
Unfortunately, in the course of pleading their case, they participated  in the unjustified
vilification of other oppressed people.  Complaining that Indians were protected from
exclusion  while blacks  were  not,  the plaintiffs  objected  that  Indians  are  "far  more
vicious as well  as unclean  and  unhealthy .... " Bickel  & Schmidt, supra note  43,  at
778 n.146  (quoting  Brief for  Appellants  at  50-51,  McCabe  v.  Atchison,  Topeka  &
Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151  (1914)).
88.  In  an effort to defend Leo Frank  against  rape charges,  see supra note 44  and
accompanying  text, supporters  pointed to a black man who should have  been a prime
suspect.  They attempted to foment anger against him by resorting to racist, anti-black
stereotypes  that  depict  black  men  as  rapacious  sexual  beasts.  A  sign  of  the
extraordinary  character of the animus against Frank  is that  the Negro-baiting  tactics
of his defenders  failed.  They "expressed outrage  that a white employer was indicted,
rather  than  a black  worker with  a  criminal  record,  and  shock  that  their  appeals  to
white supremacy  failed  to  rally the jury  or  the  public."  Nancy  MacLean,  The  Leo
Frank Case Reconsidered: Gender and Sexual Politics in the Making of Reactionary
Populism, 78  J.  Am.  Hist.  917,  925  (1991).  Many  blacks  reacted  angrily  to  this
attempt to supercede anti-Jewish prejudice  with anti-black  bigotry. See Eugene  Levy,
"Is the Jew a White  Man?": Press Reaction to  the Leo  Frank Case, 1913-1915, 35
Phylon 212, 215-18 (1974).
89.  See  Kwang  Chung Kim  & Shin  Kim,  The Multiracial  Nature of Los Angeles
Unrest in  1992, in  Koreans  in  the Hood:  Conflict  with  African  Americans  17,  34
(Kwang  Chung Kim ed.,  1999)  [hereinafter Koreans in  the Hood]; Heon  Cheol Lee.
Conflict Between Korean Merchants and Black Customers: A  Structural  Analysis,  in
Koreans  in the Hood, supra, at  113,  114; Pyong  Gap Min  & Andrew  Kolodny,  The
Middleman Minority Characteristics  of Korean Immigrants in  the  United States,  in
Koreans in  the Hood, supra,  at 131,  144-49.
90.  Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 683 (3d ed. 1992).  It should be
noted  that in  the fourth edition  of Race, Racism and American Law, Professor  Bell
changes  "White  racism"  to  "American  racism."  Derrick  Bell,  Race,  Racism  and
American  Law  1029 (4th ed. 2000).  All things considered,  however, one  doubts that
this emendation signals a significant transformation in his outlook.
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Materials that should be part of a good course on race relations  law-
sociological materials  on the racial demographics  of authority  within
the society-would  enable  a student  to see  the  speciousness  of this
theory.  They would enable a student to demystify  the myth of black
powerlessness.  For  the  fact  is  that  in  an  appreciable  number  of
significant  locales  and  institutions,  blacks  do  occupy  positions  of
authority from which they could, if they so chose,  use their  power to
effectuate  prejudices.  Scores  of  cities,  police  departments,  military
units,  prisons,  personnel  offices,  and  social  service  agencies  are
directed  by  black  officials  who, like  their  white  counterparts,  make
numerous  low-visibility,  discretionary  choices  that  are  routinely
granted  tremendous  deference  both  within  and  without  the
bureaucracies in which they function.
Furthermore, under certain circumstances, even weak individuals or
groups can exercise  power over  others  who, in the normal  course  of
things, occupy a higher social status.  I think here of the lowly rapist or
a group of historically-victimized  rapists.  I think of what happened  to
a thirty-year  old woman whose assailant,  before  raping her, told  her
that before she died  he would  make sure  that she  knew what  it  felt
like  to "have  a  nigger  cock."91  I  think,  too, of what  happened  to
Kristin Huggins, the victim of a rape-murder  in  1992  at the hands of
Ambrose A. Harris.  Harris  and an  associate  agreed  to perpetrate  a
car-jacking  so  that  they  would  have  an  automobile  with  which  to
commit  a  robbery  they were  planning.  Offering  clarification  as  to
what would  be  done  with inconvenient  prisoners,  Harris  reportedly
said that he would  "'tie them up and leave  them somewhere'  if they
were  black....  [but]  would  kill  them  if they  were  white."' -  When
Huggins  unluckily  drove  her  car  near  Harris,  he  is  said  to  have
muttered "I'm going to get that bitch." 9 3  Finally,  I think of a tragedy
that occurred  in 1992,  near  Charleston,  South  Carolina.  Four  black
men abducted  a  white  woman,  Melissa  McLauchlin,  raped  her, and
then  killed  her.  Seeking  to  explain  their  actions,  one  of  the
perpetrators  stated  that it  constituted  retaliation  for  "four  hundred
years of oppression."'
Beyond  the  empirical  fact  that  blacks  can  and  do  exercise
appreciable  amounts  of  power  in  America,  even  while  they  remain
subjected  to  invidious  and  intolerable  racial  subordination,  is  the
additional  fact  that  circumstances  sometimes  change  with
breathtaking  rapidity,  empowering  those  who  have  been  oppressed
and lowering those who have been ascendant.  It is important, then, to
91.  Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 367 S.E.2d 176, 178 (Va. Ct. App.  1988).
92.  State v. Harris, 716 A.2d 458,465 (NJ. 1998) (footnote omitted).
93.  Id-
94.  Chris Sosnovski,  Death  Penalty  to be Sought for Gardner,  Post & Courier,
Apr. 14, 1995, at A21; see also Richard Green, Jr., Trials Are Judge's  Swan Song, Post
& Courier, Mar. 2,1998, at Al (summarizing  the crime).
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be attentive  to the moral hygiene  of the weak.  World  history shows
quite  vividly  that  persons  and  groups  who  have  been  dealt  with
unjustly-I think, for  example,  of certain Serbs and Jews-are  quite
capable of donning cloaks of victimhood and visiting terrible injustices
on others.
Given  these  considerations,  teachers  of courses  on  race  relations
law in  the  United  States  should  definitely  be  self-conscious  as  they
proceed  to  advocate  favored  policies;  otherwise  they  will  simply
proceed  to be  unselfconscious  advocates.  In  advocating  one  policy,
doctrine,  or  outcome  over  others,  however,  a  teacher's  conclusion
should rest on a firmer foundation  than that it advances  the fortunes
of the race with which the teacher happens to identify.  Thus, knowing
the racial demographics  of who a given policy helped or hurt, or who
now  supports  or opposes  a  given reform,  is  an insufficient  basis  for
judging  its  propriety.  An  appropriate  basis  is  whether  the  policy,
doctrine,  or outcome satisfies  a  conception of justice that  is  broader,
grander,  and  more  attractive  than  the  simple  preferences,  racial
identity, or naked subjectivity of the teacher in charge.
Professors should also keep in mind that even amongst those united
in their desire to achieve  "racial justice,"  the way towards  that goal is
not at all  clear.  People  differ over what they mean by  racial justice.
Some  mean  preventing  all  forms  of  private  or  public  racial
discrimination.  Some mean  preventing  all  forms  of invidious  racial
discrimination.  Some mean  preventing  all  forms  of  invidious  racial
discrimination  and redressing the discernible vestiges of racial wrongs
done in the past.  On the other hand, some mean merely prohibiting
governments  from  engaging  in  invidious  racial  discrimination,  while
expressly  permitting  private  parties  to  do  so.  Furthermore,  even
people  who embrace  one  of these competing  visions  of racial justice
differ  over  which  strategies  to  pursue  to  reach  their  agreed  ends.
Against  this backdrop  of complexity, flux,  and contestation,  teachers
ought  to  inculcate  within  students  a  willingness  to  experiment,  an
appreciation for empirical research  that might shed light on the actual
consequences  of various policies,  and a tolerance for listening closely
to competing views.
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